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Stephanie Cronin’s account of the relationship between army and state in the Middle East over the course of the last two hundred years is that of Frankenstein’s monster: local rulers desperate to modernise, augment their power, and resist European encroachment created hybrid European-style armies, only to have their creations threaten them and then turn on them in the twentieth century. This is a story not just about the Middle East but is a broader history about modernisation, and about the military revolution and state formation that Europe experienced in the early modern period, processes that never effectively took root in the Middle East. As Cronin rightly argues (p. 18), in the Middle East unlike in Europe, ‘the military revolution had been supported neither by any substantive fiscal revolution nor by the agricultural and industrial revolutions which were powering European military development.’ As the book under review proves, military reform in isolation without concomitant state formation and societal change is bound to fail. There are echoes here of Michal Roberts’ military revolution argument from the 1950s, ones that Cronin refers explicitly to in her conclusion: the foundations of the modern European state lay in military developments such as gunpowder and drill that required stronger government, and the powerful state that flowed from this then had the power to boost military power. This was the foundation of European power, strength that states across the Middle East tried to emulate but without much success. Paradoxically, tight-knit, irregular, traditional, religiously based military forces were often best equipped to resist and fight European expansion in the Middle East, right up to al-Qaida after 2001 and Hizbullah in Lebanon 2006. The Afghan resistance to the British in four Anglo-Afghan wars from the 1840s to 2001 is another case in point.

Cronin’s introduction ranges across the region from Morocco to Afghanistan, the author bearing her erudition lightly, making for a readable, informative text; the chapters thereafter examine three case studies, ones that work well with the author’s expertise: Iran, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. It is to be hoped that the particular case studies presented here will be matched at some stage by similarly rigorous analyses of other states touched on in the book, such as Egypt, Syria, Algeria, and Morocco. While the thesis presented here on the troubled relationship between army and state is not new, the author brings to the study of the subject a deep historical analysis that teases out a set of themes, some of which are generally applicable across the region and some of which are particular to the case studies. Firstly, there were moments of success, such as the Gendarmerie in Iran, or the Turkish army under Ataturk, the latter an interesting example of an army that was effective in terms of being combat ready while also having a disproportionate and inappropriate influence on the new Turkish republic. While local rulers hoped for new, regular (nizam) regiments that would owe their allegiance and survival to the new state, what flowed from military reform was corruption, external interference, and very little in the way of a fighting army. Foreign missions flooded into Iran, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia to build the new armies, not just soldiers from France, Russia, Britain, Austria-Hungary, and Sweden but Americans, Ottomans and Soviets, alongside an eclectic group of soldiers-of-fortune. These missions needed to be paid, either locally or by the country sending the advisors, losing the local regimes revenue and their authority. The chapters on Iran and Saudi Arabia show how by the late twentieth century, the petrodollars earned from oil production were recycled back to the West to pay for masses of modern arms and equipment, most of which the local regimes could not use as they were not sufficiently technically advanced, widespread illiteracy being one problem. When, for instance, Iraq threatened Saudi Arabia in 1990, the Saudis’ well-equipped, US-supplied army was useless, forcing the kingdom to call in American troops. Similarly, when Islamist insurgents seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979, Saudi forces struggled to re-take the complex and had to call in French Special Forces.

Cronin’s book is a work of politics and not a military study per se. That said, she uses texts such as Kenneth Pollack’s book on the poor military effectiveness of Arab armies to examine the root causes of military failure, which, as she argues, lie beyond simple issues of military ‘kit’ and training. For European armies, the problem was one of the Orient (p. 51), as a Russian staff officer observed: ‘After losing their Asian agility and quickness, the sarbaz [French-trained Iranian troops] have not however acquired European characteristics and are a base and dirty force, badly dressed and created as victims for our grenadiers. They cannot even handle the English muskets which they have been given.’ As with the early British army, when the colonels of regiments saw their units as a way to line their own pockets, in Qajar Iran (p. 63) new armies were nothing but a ‘conduit’ for channelling money to elite local families. How much of this was a locally generated problem as opposed to baleful external influence is hard to say but when there were no foreign missions in Iran from 1921 to 1941 Cronin makes the point that this was when the army improved, before US huge amounts of military aid started to arrive from the 1940s. Cronin gives the Soviet period of support for Afghanistan a lighter touch, before arguing that the US support for the mujahidin in the 1980s helped to destroy the fledgling Afghan state.

Local rulers were beguiled by Western military advances, such as the advent of air power from the 1920s – which local potentates were quite willing to use to bomb their own recalcitrant populace – without realising that such things required a vast support infrastructure, one that eluded Middle Eastern countries. The result was hybrid forces, with ‘modern’ armies around capital cities like Kabul while the rest of the country fought with irregular militias. Saudi Arabia was exceptional, there being two armies, an army and a National Guard, the latter there as a praetorian guard to protect the ruling dynasty. Cronin argues that in Saudi Arabia the army was there to maintain social order rather than act as a force to transform the country. Saudi Arabia (p. 206) experienced not military modernisation ‘but rather military modernisation in reverse, the strength of tribal and family ties and patronage not weakened but rather embedded ever more deeply within a system of patrimonial rule.’ Through all of this, the establishment of a professional officer corps was a permanent problem, there being no military colleges to train such a class of soldiers across most of the region.

Cronin is to be congratulated for her academic study that will be used by established scholars looking for rich historical detail on the subject of armies and state formation through the case studies presented in her book, and as a set text for students wanting to know why the nexus between nation, army and state has been so troubling for the countries of the Middle East.
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